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Trends on the Raw Materials Markets and 
Policy Responses 
Since the turn of the millennium, increasing and 
sometimes volatile prices in combination with tem-
porary supply shortages have moved minerals and 
metals high up the agendas of policymakers around 
the world. Numerous documents published by govern-
ments across the world document the urgency of the 
issue – the raw materials strategy of the German Fed-
eral Government being just one of them. 
One reason why the state is currently experiencing 
a renaissance in the raw materials sector lies in the 
surge in demand, which came as a surprise to many 
market participants.1
 
1  For a more extensive discussion, see Hanns Günther 
Hilpert, Gitta Lauster, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Florian 
Wassenberg, “Wettlauf um Metalle: Eisenerz und Seltene 
Erden,” in Konfliktrisiko Rohstoffe? Herausforderungen und Chancen 
im Umgang mit knappen Ressourcen, SWP-Studie 5/2011, ed. 
Stormy-Annika Mildner, pp. 131–70 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2011); Hanns Günther 
Hilpert, Gitta Lauster, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Florian 
Wassenberg, “Metals: The Case of Rare Earths,” in Resource 
Scarcity – A Global Security Threat? SWP Research Paper 2/2011, 
ed. Stormy-Annika Mildner, Solveig Richter, and Gitta 
Lauster, pp. 25–27 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
March 2011). 
 While there is no reason to fear 
exhaustion of minerals and metals from a geological 
perspective, prices cannot be expected to return to 
the 
$'	<&=$&<&+$8&+%+– 
even if a cyclical downturn is quite conceivable. 
Driven by growing demand from China and other 
emerging economies, the former buyers’ market has 
turned into a veritable sellers’ market. Changing in-
dustrial demand structures, strong geographical and 
business concentration of supply, political inter-
ventions in the markets (such as export controls), and 
ecologically, politically, and socially driven conflicts 
in many poorer producing countries have further 
increased prices. Moreover, raw materials have 
become an attractive object of financial speculation. 
Due to the exhaustion of certain traditional mining 
sites, high development costs for new projects, long 
phase-in times, and high investment risks, global 
supply has not been able to adapt quickly to rising 
demand and prices. As a consequence, the most recent 
boom (2003 to early 2012) proved to be the longest 
+%
&4+&&>	&, p. 12). 
Prices fell temporarily in the course of the financial 
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shortly thereafter. For example, the price of a tonne of 
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#2 The price of 
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#$Y[#
during the same period.3
Although the raw materials sector has always been 
one in which states and state-owned enterprises oper-
ate, state interventions have increased in number and 
intensity since the mid-2000s. The laissez-faire attitude 
towards international raw materials markets is in-
creasingly on the retreat. 
 Prices fell between late 2011/ 
early 2012 and mid-2012 due to depressed economic 
prospects in Europe and China. Since mid-2012, how-
ever, prices of important industrial minerals have 
risen again. Most analysts expect prices to remain at a 
generally high level in the medium term – providing 
the euro crisis is resolved and stronger growth returns 
to emerging economies. 
The strategic objectives and instruments of national 
raw materials policies vary according to the domestic 
raw materials base, domestic demand, and depend-
ence on international markets. Accordingly, the inter-
ests of consumer and producer countries contrast 
sharply. Import-dependent countries are interested 
primarily in a secure supply of minerals and metals 
at affordable prices, and employ a wide range of 
measures to secure this. Some governments seek to 
arrange exclusive supply contracts or support national 
enterprises in bidding for contracts overseas. Others 
rely on strategic stockpiling to become less vulnerable 
in case of supply disruptions, or seek to diversify sup-
ply sources by concluding resource partnerships and 
supporting producer countries through investment in 
training, infrastructure, and industrial processing. 
 
2  BGR Database 2012. 
3  IMF, Primary Commodity Prices, http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/res/commod/index.asp (accessed August 21, 2012). 
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Figure 1 
Price indices of selected metals, in U.S. dollars at current market prices, January 2003 to August 2012  
(Index: 2003 = 1) 
Source: BGR Database 2012. 
 
Others still work to develop substitutes, efficiency, 
and recycling. 
The interests of resource-rich countries are more 
diverse, and resource strategies and measures differ 
widely. Some countries seek to increase the contribu-
tion of the raw materials sector to economic growth 
and development. Some are interested in maximizing 
exports while others are more concerned with secur-
ing supplies for domestic manufacturing. And some 
governments use raw materials to achieve broader 
foreign policy goals. Governments employ very dif-
ferent instruments to pursue these various interests. 
Some impose taxes on mineral and metal exports 
(such as export tariffs), sometimes even limiting ex-
ports using quotas.
 
4  WTO, WTO Document WT/TPR/OV/14, November 2011. 
 Others subsidize imports or im-
pose resource taxes, while yet others enact national 
minimum ownership quotas for mining companies 
or support the global market activities of domestic 
mining companies. In some cases, raw materials pol-
icies follow internal political and foreign policy objec-
tives rather than economic rationale. Resource nation-
alism usually results in discrimination against all 
or some foreign consumers (or countries), and in its 
strongest form can lead to nationalization of the 
resource sector. 
The government activities in consumer countries 
present a typical case of the competition paradox.5 At 
first sight, a state can improve its supply security by 
imposing export restrictions, subsidizing imports, and 
establishing raw materials stockpiles or supporting 
domestic companies investing in mining abroad. How-
ever, this strategy promises success only as long as 
other states are not employing the same measures 
(or at least not to the same degree). In the worst case, 
a prisoners’ dilemma emerges, where rational politi-
cal decisions on the national level lead to collectively 
adverse results on the global level.6
 
5  Wolfgang Stützel and Rolf-Dieter Grass, Volkswirtschaftslehre 
4]%
^_&%Q`Q#–59. 
 Unintended con-
sequences would include raw materials becoming 
6  Robert Axelrod, Die Evolution der Kooperation (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2000). 
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even scarcer on international markets, fueling price 
surges and price volatility and intensifying conflicts. 
The adverse effects in this case would not be re-
stricted to consumer countries. Although producer 
countries would benefit from higher prices and 
improved terms of trade, they would also be exposed 
to greater risks. If high resource rents coincided with 
poor governance and weak institutions, corruption, 
rent-seeking, and mismanagement, intra-state con-
flicts could soon follow. Additionally, rising exchange 
rates due to growing demand can become a hindrance 
to export-oriented manufacturing industries (the 
“Dutch disease”). Finally, environmental and resource 
protection as well as social aspects are often neglected 
as a consequence and states do not invest sufficiently 
in infrastructure, education, and health in order to 
create a solid basis for sustainable economic growth. 
An abundance of raw materials can then quickly turn 
from an engine for economic and social development 
into a curse. 
The Need for Global Governance 
“Global governance” of raw materials can counter 
the risk of a prisoners’ dilemma, keep rivalry for min-
erals and metals at bay, and strengthen the markets’ 
allocation mechanisms. Functioning international 
raw material markets require a solid framework, with 
a reliable legal system, secure transport routes, effi-
cient market platforms (raw materials exchanges), and 
reliable information (for example, from geological 
surveys). Governments also play a decisive role. For 
example, trade and competition policy can counteract 
market failures. Government action is also indispen-
sable when it comes to promoting an environmentally 
friendly and economically sustainable raw materials 
economy, developing a recycling economy, preventing 
cartels and market disruptions, and curbing local and 
international potential for conflict. While existing 
(inter)national raw materials governance may have 
been adequate during the twentieth century, in times 
of often falling prices, it is unable to tackle the new 
market and competition conditions of the twenty-first 
century. 
Within the UN system, independent study groups 
have been established for four metals: the Inter-
national Lead and Zinc Study Group (ILZSG), the In-
ternational Copper Study Group (ICSG), and the Inter-
national Nickel Study Group (INSG). These are open to 
countries with significant involvement in production, 
consumption, or international trade, usually indus-
trial and emerging economies, as well as a few re-
source-rich developing countries. The ICSG has twenty-
four members, including Australia, China, the Euro-
pean Union, and the United States. The INSG has fif-
teen, including Brazil, Australia, Japan, and Russia 
(but not the United States or China). The ILZSG has 
thirty members, including China and the United 
States. The objective of these study groups is to create 
market transparency by providing data on production, 
consumption, trade, and prices, and national policy 
approaches such as environmental legislation. But 
these initiatives do not go far enough. Concentrating 
on a certain raw material makes sense, but the remit 
of the study groups is generally too narrow.7
The Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, 
Metals, and Sustainable Development (IGF) is a forum 
for dialog and consultation to enhance the mining 
sector’s contribution to sustainable development. The 
IGF is a voluntary coalition of governments founded 
after the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) in 2005. It is the only intergovernmental 
forum that permits mining ministries from all over 
the world to exchange views on the challenges facing 
mining and its potential contribution to sustainable 
development, regardless of whether the country pos-
sesses raw materials of global significance. The IGF 
also actively promotes its topics within the global 
development and sustainability agenda. Its Mining 
Policy Framework lays out comprehensive recommen-
dations on best practice and policy in the minerals 
sector.
 

The International Resource Panel (IRP) of the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) is a first step 
 More than half of its forty-three members are 
African countries. Others include significant resource-
producing developing and emerging economies in 
Asia (Kazakhstan, Mongolia), Oceania, Latin America 
(Brazil, Mexico), and the Caribbean, as well as Austra-
lia, Canada, and Russia. But important actors such as 
China, Japan, and the United States are not members, 
and from the European Union only the United King-
dom and Romania have joined. 
 
7  International Lead and Zinc Study Group, http:// 
www.ilzsg.org/static/home.aspx; International Copper 
Study Group, http://www.icsg.org; International Nickel Study 
Group, http://www.insg.org (accessed October 11, 2012). 
8  Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals 
and Sustainable Development, Mining and Sustainable Develop-
ment. Managing One to Advance the Other, 2010, http://www. 
globaldialogue.info/Mining%20Policy%20Framework%20 
final.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012). 
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toward a comprehensive approach to global manage-
ment of natural resources. Its task is to disseminate 
scientific information on the sustainable use of natu-
ral resources and provide information on environmen-
tally compatible economic growth. Metals recycling is 
one important topic. As the IRP’s task is not to develop 
binding standards, its efficacy remains limited. 
WTO rules place limits on quantitative export 
restrictions. Quantitative restrictions in the form of 
quotas or bans are forbidden. But exceptions leave 
considerable leeway: export quotas are allowed in the 
case of internal supply crises, if they serve the pro-
tection of depletable natural resources, the environ-
ment, human health and animal protection, or 
national security. Unlike import tariffs, export tariffs 
are allowed. They have not been reduced systemati-
cally in the past, nor are they bound at the WTO. The 
latter means that countries may raise existing export 
tariffs without violating WTO rules. Only a few coun-
tries have so far agreed to abolish export tariffs in 
WTO accession agreements. China is one of them. 
The G20 has recognized the importance of improv-
ing raw materials governance and has started addres-
sing the issue, although the focus to date has been on 
energy and agricultural markets rather than minerals 
and metals. Transparency and price volatility occupied 
an important place on the G20 agenda during the 
French presidency in 2011. The 2011 Summit Declara-
tion emphasized that “appropriately regulated and 
transparent agricultural financial markets are a key 
for well-functioning physical markets and risk man-
agement,” and committed to “mitigate[ing] the 
adverse effects of excessive price volatility for the most 
vulnerable through the development of appropriate 
risk-management instruments.”9 Energy resources also 
featured prominently in the final declaration. With 
regard to international raw materials markets, the 
G20 called for “enhanced market transparency […] and 
[…] appropriate regulation and supervision.” With re-
spect to derivatives markets, “[m]arket regulators and 
authorities should be granted effective intervention 
powers to address disorderly markets and prevent 
market abuses.”10
 
9  G20 Cannes Summit Final DeclarationQ+&
$%+–51, from 
G20 Information Center, University of Toronto, http://www. 
g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration--
en.html (accessed February 25, 2013). 
 Under a Japanese chair, the G20 
Study Group on Commodities analyzed the drivers 
of price volatility, also consulting many other inter-
10  Ibid., section 32. 
national institutions, and published its report in 
November 2011.11
During its G20 presidency in 2012, Mexico again 
placed food security and price volatility on the 
agenda, but the euro crisis crowded out many other 
topics and hardly any progress was achieved on raw 
materials. In the end, the summit merely confirmed 
that food security was “one of the most important 
challenges that the world faces today” and, against the 
background of a growing world population, called for 
an increase in sustainable agriculture and an inten-
sification of efforts to increase market transparency 
(for example through the Platform for Agricultural 
Risk Management, the GEO Global Agriculture Moni-
toring, and the Agricultural Market Information Sys-
tem).
 
12 The 2012 Summit also emphasized the impor-
tance of transparency on energy markets, where price 
volatility can contribute significantly to economic in-
stability, and stressed the positive impact of the Joint 
Organizations Data Initiative (JODI).13 Minerals and 
metals were not mentioned specifically in the final 
declaration. The G20 Study Group on Commodities 
merged with the Study Group on Energy to become 
the Energy and Commodity Markets Working Group. 
A subgroup on raw materials (primarily agricultural 
and energy resources) headed by the United Kingdom 
and Brazil built on the 2011 results and addressed in 
particular the macroeconomic consequences of price 
volatility on economic growth, inflation, terms of 
trade, and state budgets.
&+	&='$<&$%&+&8	&	%
the G20, to address at least one aspect of the raw mate-
rials economy: the so-called resource curse (which is 
not exclusive to developing countries). In their Sum-
mit decla	$%$8Q&
$%	&++	&++&
the significance of the raw materials industry for the 
development and stability in many countries and the 
 
 
11  G20 Study Group on Commodities, Report of the G20 Study 
Group on Commodities, http://www.cmegroup.com/education/ 
files/G20Nakaso-November202011.pdf (accessed October 10, 
2012). 
12  G20 Leaders’ DeclarationQ\%&–19, 2012, from G20 
Information Center, University of Toronto, http://www.g20. 
utoronto.ca/summits/2012loscabos.html (accessed July 25, 
2012). 
13  Ibid. 
14  Energy and Commodity Markets Working Group, G20 
Commodity Markets Subgroup Summary Report on the Impacts of 
Excessive Commodity Price Volatility on Growth (n.p., June 2012), 
http://www.g20.org/images/stories/canalfinan/deliverables/ 
energy_markets/Policy_Report_to_Mitigate_Commodity_ 
Price_Volatility.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012). 
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necessity to introduce transparency and certification 
initiatives to increase government revenues and limit 
the corruption, conflict, and violence that can be 
fueled by revenues from natural resources.15 At the 
Deauville summit in May 2011, they agreed to pro-
mote transparency by supporting EITI and committed 
“to setting in place transparency laws and regulations 
or to promoting voluntary standards that require or 
encourage oil, gas, and mining companies to disclose 
the payments they make to governments.” The aim is 
to promote economic growth and development in 
resource-rich developing countries through greater 
transparency and good governance.16
Barriers to Cooperation 
 
Although countries have become more aware that the 
challenges on the raw materials markets cannot be 
solved single-%&=Q+
++$%+%X$& and 
the G20 demonstrate how controversial the issue is. 
Some G20 states believe that the problems lie mainly 
in speculation and raw material cartels, whereas 
others blame government intervention in markets. 
The problem perceptions of the G20 members diverge 
widely, as do their concerns and interests. In light of 
rising prices and growing scarcities, strongly import-
dependent industrial countries like France, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan, are concerned primarily with security 
of supply and industrial competitiveness. China, de-
spite its large domestic mining sector, fears supply 
shortages threatening its own development and indus-
trialization. Producer countries, such as Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Russia, and South Africa welcome the 
rising prices and see them as a chance for prosperity 
and development. 
Cooperation among the G20 is further impeded by 
differing ideas about regulation and by the diversity of 
mining traditions. Whereas governments and indus-
tries in Anglo-Saxon countries place more trust in the 
allocative function of free markets, their counterparts 
in continental Europe and East Asia fear a depletion 
of mineral reserves, mismanagement of markets and 
 
15  Q“Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future”: G8 Dec-
laration (n.p., 2009), http://www##"+
" 
&$"&
	$%8%Q#8. 
16  G8 Declaration: Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democ-
racyQ&<&QQ8	$'%8$	'$%*&%&	QY%-
versity of $	$%$Q^""##$	$%$#
"+''" 
2011deauville/2011-declaration-en.html (accessed May 2, 
2012). 
disruptions in supply chains. There is generally dis-
agreement about the role of the state in the market 
and about what instruments should be used to tackle 
problems associated with the raw materials sector. 
The German Government’s Raw Materials Strategy, for 
example, states that companies themselves are respon-
sible for safeguarding their supplies. Accordingly, the 
German government should merely create the right 
conditions and intervene only where markets fail to 
function correctly. National stockpiling or a state 
company for exploration and mining are rejected as 
options. In other countries, the government plays a 
much more proactive role. In Japan and South Korea, 
companies are supported by state-owned raw mate-
rial enterprises: JOGMEC (Japan Oil, Gas and Metals 
National Corp.) and KORES (Korea Resources Corp.). 
These are responsible for maintaining national stocks 
of oil, gas, and strategic metals, and also invest active-
ly in mining and processing abroad. China goes even 
further, specifically supporting its domestic manufac-
turing sector by regulating raw materials markets, for 
example in the area of rare earth elements. 
Major differences also exist with respect to the use 
of foreign (economic) policy instruments. Whereas the 
European Union, Japan, Mexico, and the United States 
regard export restrictions such as Chinese tariffs and 
quotas on minerals and metals as competition-distort-
ing, China and other emerging economies cite nation-
al sovereignty and the need to protect, among others, 
resources, the environment, human health, and ani-
mal welfare. The G20 members also disagree on the 
objectives and the adequate instruments of develop-
ment policy. Germany, for example, ties technical and 
financial aid to clear conditions of good governance, 
at least most of the time, in order to achieve better 
raw materials governance in partner countries. China, 
by contrast, forgoes such conditions. 
The lines of conflict follow similar patterns when 
it comes to transparency in revenue streams and due 
diligence in supply chains. With the U.S. Dodd-Frank 
Act (2010) and the EU Transparency Directive (2011), the 
United States and European Union took the lead – and 
met fierce opposition from other G20 countries such 
as China and Russia. 
Differences between G20 states concerning inter-
ests, ideas about regulation, objectives, and instru-
ments interfere with effective international raw mate-
rials governance. The necessary preconditions for 
overcoming these barriers are improving transparency 
on strategies and policies pursued by the G20 mem-
bers and strengthening communication between them 
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on raw materials. Only if governments and national 
institutions dealing with raw materials communicate 
with each other, and mutual trust is built, there will 
be a realistic chance for global raw materials govern-
ance that can effectively tackle the problems on the 
markets. Even then, this will likely be a long-term 
project. 
Presently, knowledge about the policies of the G20 
states on minerals and metals is inadequate. That is 
the starting point of this report, which sets out to 
explore the opportunities and challenges of intensify-
ing international cooperation by systematically 
examining the raw materials situations, strategies, 
and instruments of the G20 countries. 
The next chapter explains the focus on G20 coun-
tries and identifies commonalities and differences 
within their raw material economies and policies. The 
individual country profiles that follow first give an 
overview of minerals in the national economy before 
analyzing a country’s raw materials strategies and 
policies. All the G20 members are covered: Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexi-
co, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
 
